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What One Hand Giveth, The Other
Taketh Away: How Future
Dangerousness Corrupts Guilt Verdicts
and Produces Premature Punishment
Decisions in Capital Cases
Elizabeth S. Vartkessian*
I.

Introduction

Contemporary death penalty trials are conducted in two parts—the
first to determine a defendant’s guilt and, if they are found guilty, the
second to decide the punishment—in order to ensure that penalty
considerations are made separate from guilt decisions. The widespread
adoption of bifurcating capital trials into two phases followed the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 which found the
administration of the death penalty unconstitutionally arbitrary and
possibly discriminatory under then prevailing statutes. Prior to Furman,
most states with capital punishment conducted unitary proceedings
during which the defendant’s guilt and penalty were determined
concurrently.2 However, in addition to placing defendants in the
challenging position of arguing against their guilt while also arguing for
a sentence less than death, unitary trials risked preventing jurors from
*
Elizabeth Vartkessian is a visiting researcher at the University at Albany School of
Criminal Justice. She received her Ph.D. in Law from the University of Oxford. Dr.
Vartkessian is the primary researcher for the third round of data collection for the Capital
Jury Project in Texas. The Author would like to thank Dr. William Bowers, Jonathan
Kerr, James Marcus, Sean O’Brien, Christopher Kelly, Gilly Ross, and Aimee Solway
who reviewed drafts and offered a number of helpful suggestions. A draft of this Article
was presented to members of the University at Albany School of Criminal Justice. The
data collection was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0520487).
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Prior to the Court’s decision in Furman, some states, such as New York,
Pennsylvania, and California, had changed their capital sentencing statutes to reflect the
growing belief that bifurcated trials would provide additional safeguards to capital
defendants absent in a unitary proceeding. See Gerhard Mueller & Douglas Besharov,
Bifurcation: The Two Phase System of Criminal Procedure in the United States, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 613 (1968).
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being given complete access to the most relevant evidence available with
respect to sentencing.3 Amidst growing concerns that such trials
permitted an unlawful amount of arbitrariness in the penalty decision, the
Supreme Court delivered their judgment in Furman, signaling the end of
unitary capital trials and unfettered discretion in capital sentencing.
Yet, it was the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia and its
companion cases that cemented the role of bifurcation in modern capital
sentencing.4 In response to the Court’s decision thirty-five states passed
new death penalty statutes designed to remedy the arbitrariness found in
Furman.5 These newly drafted statutes fell into two broad categories:
those that maintained a unitary trial and sought to eliminate arbitrariness
in sentencing by automatically making the death penalty mandatory upon
conviction of a capital crime6 and those that provided sentencing
guidelines to jurors in a second phase of the trial.7 Gregg and its
progeny8 determined that statutes which did not attempt to provide the
3. The Court acknowledged as much in its reliance on the American Law Institute’s
justification for a two-phase capital trial: “[If a unitary proceeding is used] the
determination of the punishment must be based on less than all the evidence that has a
bearing on that issue, such as a previous criminal record of the accused, or evidence must
be admitted on the ground that it is relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as
irrelevant or prejudicial with respect to guilt or innocence alone. Trial lawyers
understandably have little confidence in a solution that admits the evidence and trusts to
an instruction to the jury that it should be considered only in determining the penalty and
disregarded in assessing guilt. . . . The obvious solution is to bifurcate the proceeding,
abiding strictly by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a conviction, but once
guilt has been determined opening the record to the further information that is relevant to
sentence.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976). Although the American Law
Institute endorsed the changes brought about by Furman to capital sentencing statutes,
the Institute revised its position in 2009 withdrawing its support of the death penalty. See
Adam Liptak, Group Gives Up Death Penalty Work, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/us/05bar.html; Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker,
Report of the Council to the Membership of the American Law Institute on the Matter of
the Death Penalty, April 15, 2009, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/alicoun.pdf.
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
5. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV.
143, 145 (1986).
6. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
7. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
8. See cases cited supra note 4.
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sentencer an opportunity to make an individualized assessment of
punishment separate from the guilt decision would be unconstitutional,
but that “guided-discretion” statutes that attempted to safeguard the
punishment decision through bifurcation and by providing jurors with
factors to consider at sentencing would pass constitutional muster.9
Of the three guided-discretion statutes to pass muster with the
Court, the Texas scheme was most unique in its formulation of
sentencing factors.10 Whereas the approved statutes in Georgia11 and
Florida12 identified statutory aggravating and mitigating factors for jurors
to consider and provided instruction as to how they should approach their
sentencing decision, the Texas statute restricted the jury’s sentencing
concerns to three “special issue questions.”13 Although the Texas capital
sentencing scheme has been amended by the legislature since the Court
initially approved it in 1976,14 both the first and subsequent iterations of
9. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). These statutes also provided some type of
automatic appellate review after conviction.
10. See cases cited supra note 7.
11. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. The Georgia statute limited death eligible
crimes to six categories, instructed the jury to hear additional evidence in mitigation and
aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions or the
absence of any prior conviction and pleas, and required the jury to find at least one
statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before electing to impose death.
12. See generally Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242. The Florida statute also limited capital
punishment to a smaller classification of crimes and required the jury to consider whether
sufficient mitigating circumstances existed which outweighed the aggravating
circumstances found to exist. Based on the weighing of factors the jury was to
recommend either a death sentence or life sentence to the judge.
13. The originally approved special issue questions were:
(1) [W]hether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation,
if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711, § 3(b) (West 2009).
14. The change to the Texas capital sentencing statute was prompted by the
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the special issue questions have made a determination of the defendant’s
future dangerousness the centerpiece of the sentencing decision.15
Future dangerousness is a statutory aggravating factor in four other
states,16 and a permissible non-statutory aggravating factor in twelve (as
well as in the federal capital sentencing statute).17 However, the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, in which concerns were raised about the
statute’s ability to provide the jury with a mechanism for endorsing some types of
evidence as mitigating. In Penry, the Court stressed that jurors needed to engage in a
reasoned moral decision when determining a capital defendant’s sentence. It concluded
that the original statute was incapable of facilitating this requirement in certain cases,
focusing on the fact that some types of mitigating evidence might be simultaneously
viewed as evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness. For instance, Penry’s
evidence of mental retardation and experiences of victimization might render him less
morally blameworthy, but also indicate his inability to learn from mistakes. Thus, without
a special issue question addressing mitigating factors, jurors who wished to give
mitigating effect to his evidence would not have been able to do so. Although the
legislature changed the questions—removing the first special issue question concerning
the deliberateness of the capital murder and adding a question addressing mitigating
factors—the basic structure of the scheme remained.
15. Previous research has shown that Texas capital jurors believe that the answer to
the future dangerousness special issue question is directly linked to the defendant’s
sentence. Nearly 70 percent of jurors in Texas stated that a death sentence was required if
the defendant was shown to be a future danger. See William J. Bowers and Wanda D.
Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to Purge Arbitariness from Capital
Sentencing, 39 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 51 (2003). Texas capital jurors were twice as
likely as jurors in other states to hold this mistaken belief. Research conducted
approximately fifteen years later posed the same questions to capital jurors in Texas and
found a consistent percentage of jurors continued to maintain this false belief. See
Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, Dangerously Biased: How the Texas Capital Sentencing Statue
Encourages Jurors to be Unreceptive to Mitigating Evidence, 29 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 237
(2011). Furthermore, a current research project shows that capital jurors who deliberated
under the original and amended capital statutes in Texas held nearly identical views
regarding whether a death sentence was required if a defendant was shown to be a future
danger—69.5 vs. 69.6 percent respectively. See Elizabeth S. Vartkessian and Christopher
E. Kelly, The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same: An Analysis of Juror
Decision-Making in Texas Death Penalty Trials (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Author).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2(1) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi)
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(7)
(2002).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2006) (“The jury . . . may consider whether any other
aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.”); Arthur v. State, 575 So. 2d
1165, 1185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171, 1217 (Cal. 1999);
Walker v. State, 327 S.E.2d 475, 484 (Ga. 1985); State v. Welcome, 458 So. 2d 1235,
1256 (La. 1984); State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 543-44 (Mo. 2010); State v. Smith, 705
P.2d 1087, 1103-1105 (Mont. 1985); Redmen v. State, 828 P.2d 395, 400 (Nev. 1992),
overruled on other grounds by Alford v. State, 906 P.2d 714 (Nev. 1995); State v. Steen,
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and Oregon statutes are the only two states which require the jury to
make such a determination.18 Though jurors are instructed to determine
the defendant’s dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, they do not
receive any additional statutory guidance for determining the defendant’s
future dangerousness.
Both the unusual sentencing requirement that jurors determine the
defendant’s dangerousness and the relative lack of statutory guidance
provided to the jury in order to reach a decision is especially important in
light of the extant literature regarding predictions of future
dangerousness. Research indicates that projections of a defendant’s
dangerousness are poor predictions of whether or not a defendant will
actually commit future acts of violence.19 Research also indicates that
mental health professionals who hold themselves out as future
dangerousness “experts” are often inaccurate in their assessments.20 The
American Psychological Association (APA) itself recognized that, even
under the best circumstances, predictions of future dangerousness by
their own colleagues are inaccurate in two out of every three cases.21
Moreover, research shows that jurors’ predictions of future
dangerousness are equally mistaken and that jurors tend to automatically
err in the direction of finding future dangerousness when faced with
answering the special issue question.22
536 S.E.2d 1, 30-31 (N.C. 2000); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 280 (Ohio 1988);
Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243, 253-54 (Pa. 2000); State v. Young, 459
S.E.2d 84, 87 (S.C. 1995); State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 759 (Utah 2003).
18. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(A)–(D) (2009); See William W. Berry III,
Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 894 (2010). Four additional states—Idaho, Virginia, Oklahoma,
and Wyoming—identify the defendant’s future dangerousness as a statutory aggravating
factor. As one commentator noted, the six states which direct the jury to consider the
defendant’s future danger accounts for over 50 percent of executions in the post-Furman
era. Id.
19. See Mark Douglas Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Capital Offenders in Texas
Prisons: Rates, Correlates, and an Actuarial Analysis of Violent Misconduct, 31 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 553 (2007); Mark D. Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Improbable
Predictions at Capital Sentencing: Contrasting Prison Violence Outcomes, 38 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 61 (2010); Mark D. Cunningham et al, Capital Jury DecisionMaking: The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y &
L. 223 (2009).
20. See Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 3, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080),
available at http://www.psych.org/lib_archives/archives/amicus_1982_barefoot.pdf.
21. Id.
22. See James W. Marquart et al, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors
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In addition to the likelihood that trained professionals and juries are
often incorrect in determining a defendant’s dangerousness, another
concern also emerges from the statute’s emphasis on future
dangerousness. In a capital case, jurors go through the process of “deathqualification” during jury selection or voir dire23 and are questioned
about their ability to impose a sentence of death.24 Previous research
shows that the experience of death-qualification itself will affect jurors’
perceptions of the guilt and punishment phase evidence.25 Moreover,
death-qualification necessitates that potential jurors learn about their
state’s sentencing statute in order to determine whether the juror is able
to follow the applicable law in the case. Commentators have noted that
the capital trial—especially the punishment decision—is unlike any
other.26 The Supreme Court itself noted that a “capital sentencing jury is
made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called
on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice.”27 Due to their
lack of expertise and limited experience in understanding the legal
requirements for determining the defendant’s guilt and punishment,
jurors will tend to place great value on the explanations they are provided
during jury selection.28
Thus, in Texas, through the process of death-qualification jurors
will learn about the requirement that they decide the defendant’s future
dangerousness at jury selection and be provided examples of evidence
which may assist them in resolving an answer to this special issue
question. As shown in this Article, during voir dire jurors are often
informed that they may use the evidence presented in the guilt phase as
Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449 (1989).
23. Voir dire is a phrase commonly used when describing jury selection and refers
to an oath to tell the truth. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009).
24. See Craig Haney et al, “Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing
Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619 (1994).
25. See Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the
Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984); Craig Haney, On the Selection of
Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 121 (1984).
26. See generally Craig Haney et al, Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries,
Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES, 149 (1994).
27. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985).
28. In Texas, since the special issue questions contain a number of words which are
left statutorily undefined, legal actors are able to provide jurors with a wide range of
examples which shape their interpretation of the special issue questions. See Elizabeth S.
Vartkessian, Dangerously Biased: How the Texas Capital Sentencing Statue Encourages
Jurors to be Unreceptive to Mitigating Evidence, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 237 (2011).
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the sole determining factor in deciding whether the defendant is a future
danger. What therefore is the effect of exposing jurors to the future
dangerousness special issue question during jury selection? Are there
implications for jurors’ culpability and punishment decisions which may
undermine the Court’s requirements that the sentencing decision be made
separately after receiving all available evidence about the defendant’s
background, character, and the crime in order to come to a reasoned
moral judgment? By focusing on the statutory requirement that jurors
determine the defendant’s future dangerousness we may therefore be
able to better understand the capital sentencing process within America’s
busiest death penalty state.
A.

Why Focus on Texas?

Texas utilizes capital punishment more frequently than most other
states. In addition to Texas’ unmatched record of executions since capital
punishment resumed in 197629 it is probable that capital defendants in
Texas are also more likely to receive a death sentence if their case
proceeds to the punishment phase of trial than defendants in other states.
Historically, once convicted, between 75-80 percent of capital defendants
in Texas have been sentenced to death.30 It has been suggested that
jurisdictions such as California experience closer to a 50 percent return
of death verdicts from capital trials.31Although the data are incomplete
on this last point with respect to death sentencing rates in Texas and
those of other states in more recent times, available data suggests the
continuation of this trend.32
29. Texas has accounted for 464 of the 1,234 executions carried out since the death
penalty was reinstated. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2010: YEAR
END REPORT 1 (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2010YearEnd-Final.pdf,
30. Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury DecisionMaking in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC. CHANGE 743,
772 (1990-91) (showing that capital juries returned death sentences in 77 percent of all
cases between 1974-1988).
31. See Brent Newton, A Case Study in Systematic Unfairness: The Texas Death
Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 7 n.38 (1993); DAVID BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 233
(1990). These authors provide death sentencing rates both prior to, and after, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia and indicate death sentencing rates in Georgia
after Furman to be 55 percent. Other jurisdictions showed similar rates. Id.
32. The sample of cases included in the current study was drawn during an eighteenmonth period ranging from 2006 to 2008. During that time seventeen capital cases were
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Recent developments in other states also signal a greater divide
between Texas’ enthusiasm for capital punishment and the rest of
America. New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, and most recently
Connecticut have each legislatively abolished the death penalty.33 Repeal
legislation has been introduced in Kansas, Maryland, Colorado, New
Hampshire, Nebraska, and Washington.34 In some instances such
measures failed by a single vote.35 Public opinion appears to be roughly
split between those supporting the death penalty and those who prefer
life without the opportunity for parole (LWOP) as a punishment for
murder.36 The number of exonerations from death row continues to
grow37 and yet, even with recently discovered evidence in several Texas
tried. One trial ended in a hung jury at the guilt phase, twelve resulted in death sentences,
and the remainder resulted in sentences of LWOP which is consistent with an 80 percent
rate of receiving a death sentence at trial.
33. Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html; New Mexico
Abolishes Death Penalty, CBS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2009, 9:05 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/18/national/main4874296.shtml; Ariane de
Vogue & Barbara Pinto, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty; 16th State to End
Executions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/illinois-16thstate-abolish-death-penalty/story?id=13095912.; David Ariosto, Connecticut Becomes the
17th State to Abolish Death Penalty, CNN JUSTICE (Apr. 25, 2012), available at
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-04-25/justice/justice_connecticut-death-penalty-lawrepealed_1_capital-punishment-death-penalty-information-center-deathsentences?_s=PM:JUSTICE.
34. See Alice Popovici, Maryland Considers Death Penalty Repeal, NAT’L
CATHOLIC REP. (Feb. 27, 2009), http://ncronline.org/news/justice/maryland-considersdeath-penalty-repeal (“Bills seeking to repeal the death penalty have been introduced in
Nebraska, Colorado, New Hampshire, Washington and Kansas.”). For a summary of
recent legislative activity regarding capital punishment see the Death Penalty Information
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity.
35. Jessica Fender & Lynn Bartels, Bid to Repeal Death Penalty Fails in Senate,
DENVER POST, May 6, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12307296 (noting that the
legislation failed to pass in the Colorado Senate by a vote of eighteen to seventeen).
36. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx
(last updated Mar. 9, 2012, 1:00 PM) (polls also indicate similar splits in preference when
respondents are asked whether they prefer the death penalty or life without the
opportunity for parole for a convicted murderer); Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
Poll Shows Growing Support for Alternatives to the Death Penalty; Capital Punishment
Ranked
Lowest
Among
Budget
Priorities
(Nov.
16,
2010),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pollresults (one poll shows that those interviewed
preferred life without the opportunity for parole plus restitution for victim survivors more
than the death penalty—only thirty-three percent of respondents said that they preferred
the death penalty as opposed to other sentencing options).
37. Innocence and Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last updated Feb. 7, 2012)
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cases which strongly suggests that the state has executed an innocent
person,38 the use of capital punishment there continues.
Scholars have offered a number of valid and useful theories for
understanding the disproportionate use of capital punishment in Texas.
Some have suggested the anomaly is due to historically-rooted cultural
values of vigilantism.39 Others argue that it is a coincidence of legal and
political happenstance.40 Many members of the public perceive the
Supreme Court’s consistent involvement in death penalty cases as a sign

(140 death row exonerations have occurred since 1973—of those, twelve are from
Texas). As regards future dangerousness, the inescapable conclusion from these
exonerations is that jurors in these twelve Texas cases found that men who had never
killed would nevertheless kill in the future.
38. See James S. Liebman, Shawn Crowley, Andrew Markquart, Lauren
Rosenberg, Lauren Gallo White, & Daniel Zharkovsky, Los Tocayos Carlos 43 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. (2012). Carlos DeLuna was executed by the state of Texas in
1989. The authors present evidence that they uncovered demonstrating that DeLuna, a
poor Hispanic man with childlike intellect, was innocent. The book length monograph
and
multimedia
presentation
of
the
evidence
can
be
found
at,
http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/ltc/. See also David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas
Execute
an
Innocent
Man?,
NEW
YORKER
(Sept.
7,
2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact
_grann. Cameron Todd Willingham was executed in 2004 for the deaths of his children in
a house fire and maintained his innocence until his death. Id. He was convicted with
questionable evidence from an arson expert. Id. Importantly, other experts versed in the
best scientific practices of arson investigation have strenuously argued that the fire was
accidental and likely caused by a space heater or faulty electrical wiring. Id. See also
David Mann, DNA Tests Undermine Evidence in Texas: New Results Shows that Claude
Jones was put to Death on Flawed Evidence, TEXAS OBSERVER (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.texasobserver.org/cover-story/texas-observer-exclusive-dna-tests-undermineevidence-in-texas-execution (illustrating problems with forensic evidence in that new
DNA evidence has shown that a strand of hair—the only evidence placing Jones at the
murder—has no connection to the executed man). The inescapable conclusion in these
numerous Texas cases is that jurors that found that men who had never killed would
nevertheless kill in the future.
39. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 90 (2003) (Zimring argues that there is a distinct relationship between areas
in America which witnessed high numbers of lynchings and those which are leaders in
the use of death sentencing and executions). See also James W. Marquart, Sheldon
Ekland-Olson and Jonathan R. Sorensen, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR AND THE NEEDLE (1994).
This is especially true of counties within East Texas which had the highest concentrations
of slaves within the state, the most active occurrences of lynchings, and subsequently
account for the greatest number of death sentences and executions.
40. See David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT
& SOC'Y 347, 350 (2005) (asserting that the death penalty is a recent development, which
resulted from legal and political decisions rather than any deep rooted value-system or
culture).
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that the system is functioning appropriately, as opposed to an indication
that something is fundamentally wrong. Thus, it is the Court’s repeated
and failed attempts to “fix” the death penalty that may be inhibiting the
momentum for abolition. Finally, the death penalty has remained a
heavily politicized issue in Texas. In particular, it is likely that Texas’
practice of electing partisan judges at both the trial and appellate levels
contributes to the inordinate use of the death penalty in that state.41 The
cultural, historical, and political arguments offered by others provide a
meta-narrative. However, these arguments fail to recognize the unique
dynamic occurring in Texas trial courts, in large part due to the unusual
sentencing scheme. In this Article, I advance the theoretical debate about
the continued use of capital punishment in Texas by demonstrating that
the sentencing scheme’s focus on the defendant’s future dangerousness
and its treatment of this issue during voir dire bear much of the
responsibility for the resultant death sentences within Texas.
In order to examine how jurors’ early exposure to the concept of the
defendant’s future dangerousness influences guilty verdicts and early
punishment decisions, I present recently collected data from the Capital
Jury Project (CJP).42 The CJP is a consortium of university-based
researchers who administer an interviewing instrument with participating
capital jurors from around the country. One of the main aims of the
CJP’s research is to investigate whether capital jurors arrive at their
sentencing decision in a manner consistent with the dictates of the
Supreme Court and their state’s capital sentencing scheme. In the more
recent data collection efforts, importance has also been placed on
collecting the trial transcripts in the cases in which the interviewed jurors
participated.43 Thus, the data presented in this Article come from two
sources: transcripts from eight capital trials conducted in Texas44 and

41. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION 48 (2010) (“Judicial elections take place in thirty-one out of thirty-five
death penalty states, and judges have sometimes been deselected because their capital
appeals decisions were out of line with the views of their constituents.”). See also
Stephen Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Federal
Habeas Corpus Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1806, 1808 (2000).
42. Capital Jury Project, SCH. CRIM. JUST., U. ALBANY, ST. U. OF N.Y.,
http://www.albany.edu/scj/capital_jury_project.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
43. See id.
44. In 2005 the Texas capital statute changed the alternative to a death sentence
from life with parole eligibility in forty years to LWOP. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2009). In order for the data to be sensitive to that change the
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data from semi-structured in-person interviews with forty-six
deliberating jurors from those eight trials.45 The in-person interviews
were all conducted with the study-wide survey instrument, which
contained a mixture of fixed-choice and open-ended questions that traced
jurors’ experiences throughout the trial process.46
Since jurors are provided a framework understanding of the
sentencing statute during jury selection, I first look at how jurors are
introduced to the concept of the defendant’s dangerousness during that
process. In particular, I outline the manner in which jurors are
encouraged to think about how the guilt phase evidence relates to the
defendant’s dangerousness. Section two then provides a general sketch of
the evidence presented during the guilt phase in the eight trials included
in this study which jurors deemed most significant during guilt
deliberations. Sections three and four examine jurors’ guilt phase
deliberations and evaluate jurors’ tendency to use guilt phase evidence to
reach a premature punishment decision. Section five discusses the
constitutional implications of allowing an assessment of the defendant’s
future dangerousness to be given such a central role in the sentencing
determination. In this Section I suggest that early exposure to the
sentencing scheme results in jurors interpreting the guilt phase evidence
as evidence of the defendant’s dangerousness and therefore undermines
their ability to suspend judgment with respect to the defendant’s
sentence. Thus, I consider some ways in which the operation of
bifurcation may be maintained in Texas.

sample was restricted to cases in which the defendant was tried under the most recent
statute. Even numbers of trials which resulted in a death sentence and those which
resulted in a sentence of LWOP were included in the sample. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2011).
45. The Author interviewed twenty-four jurors who deliberated in cases which
resulted in a sentence of death and twenty-two jurors who deliberated in cases which
resulted in LWOP.
46. ELIZABETH S. VARTKESSIAN, CAPITAL JURY PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE (on file
with Author). This survey instrument is personally maintained and on file with the
Author. The instrument asked jurors about their knowledge of the case prior to trial, jury
selection, recollections and responses to the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty
phases, accounts of jury deliberations at both guilt and sentencing, their impressions of
the legal actors, the defendant and the victims and their families, and finally their views
on the criminal justice system generally and capital punishment specifically. The
interviews for the forty-six jurors included in the Texas segment of the CJP research
lasted between three and eleven hours, averaging just under six hours.
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Descriptions of the Guilt Phase in Voir Dire

Voir dire plays a critical role in shaping the mindset of capital
jurors. It is during this initial stage of the capital trial that potential jurors
will experience the process of death-qualification and be made aware of
the fact, if they have not been already, that they might be participating in
a death penalty case. Death-qualification attempts to ensure that only
eligible prospective jurors are selected to deliberate in a capital case. In
order to be eligible for jury service in a capital trial a juror must be able
to afford the defendant an individual assessment of the punishment he or
she deserves based on the evidence presented.47 Each juror is routinely
(and often repeatedly) questioned by the judge and attorneys in order to
assess their capacity to suspend judgment regarding a sentencing
decision and apply the law in an even-handed manner. Thus, jurors who
are death-qualified would have been questioned about their ability to
consider and give a sentence of death or of LWOP to convicted capital
murderers. Those who are unable or unwilling to sentence someone to
death are excluded from jury.
An important outcome of the repeated questioning jurors experience
during death-qualification is biasing effects regarding the defendant’s
guilt and punishment. Research indicates that death-qualified jurors, due
to questioning focused on sentencing concerns, enter the trial tending to
believe that the defendant is guilty, that he will be convicted of capital
murder, and that death is likely to be the appropriate sentence.48 In fact,
studies show that jurors who are death-qualified are less likely to be
persuaded by mitigating factors and more likely to be persuaded by
aggravating factors.49 Death-qualified jurors, therefore, are more
conviction-oriented and punitive than their excludable counterparts.50 In
addition, extant literature also demonstrates that capital jurors enter the
trial primed to view the defendant as less than human through extensive
47. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (ruling that jurors who could not
give effect to mitigation evidence could be struck for cause).
48. See Haney, supra note 22.
49. Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror
Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 152 (1996).
50. Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death
Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984). The authors of
this study conducted a phone survey on a sample of 811 participants who were juryeligible. The study distinguished between excludable jurors unwilling to impose a death
sentence in any case and those who were unwilling to impose a death sentence but able to
be impartial in determining a defendant’s guilt. See id.
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exposure to a wide range of media which portray criminal defendants as
insane and unfeeling madmen.51 Predisposed to view the defendant
suspiciously and having experienced the process of death-qualification,
selected jurors will then go on to learn about the centrality of the
defendant’s future dangerousness in determining their sentence.
Although there are a number of techniques advanced by the state
and the defense during voir dire to orient jurors to a particular view of
the capital trial process and the evidence, below I identify three common
and especially influential arguments which judges and attorneys for the
state use and which appear to conflate the guilt and punishment
decisions. This analysis is limited to judicial and prosecutorial comments
for several reasons. First, the judicial and prosecutorial remarks given in
these eight trials were often very similar to one another.52 Since jurors
are more likely to credit the judge’s explanation of the process as valid,
any alignment between judicial and state comments is likely to be taken
as fact, whereas comments provided by the defense are more often
viewed as argument. Likewise, even in trials where the judge did not
make any remarks to jurors about the sentencing statute, the
interpretation of the sentencing scheme provided by prosecutors was
viewed as more legitimate and therefore more persuasive than that given
by the defense.53 Finally, in all trials the defense questioned jurors last.
As such, by the time the defense had the opportunity to present jurors
with an alternative perspective of the sentencing statute they had already
been thoroughly exposed to earlier explanations and were therefore less
likely to be receptive.

51. Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 549 (1995).
52. Vartkessian, supra note 25, at 251-58.
53. In addition, a review of the trial transcripts show that, on average, the defense in
the eight trials included in this study engaged in less vigorous questioning than the state
during jury selection. Jurors were also asked to rate the performance of the defense and
prosecution on a one-to-ten scale. Jurors answered a number of questions concerning the
effectiveness of each side’s overall performance, whether jurors thought they were
prepared for the guilt phase and the penalty phase, whether they thought each side fought
hard at the guilt and penalty phase, and whether they viewed the team as competent and
professional. Regardless of trial outcome, the defense received lower average scores in
every category compared to the prosecution. Defense teams in cases which resulted in a
sentence of death received the lowest average scores in all categories.
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Punishment Decision Is the Same as Guilt Determination

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a capital
defendant’s sentence must be based on an individual determination, one
that is not automatic,54 and one that is the result of an inquiry into to the
moral blameworthiness of the defendant.55 In order to fully safeguard the
distinct nature of the punishment decision it is essential that jurors be
provided with a clear explanation for how this decision differs from the
guilt determination. One way that these issues appear to become
confused is through examples that frame the penalty phase as an
extension of the guilt phase. For example, the following account was
provided by a prosecutor to a juror during voir dire:
There are two phases in a case that ends up—criminal
cases are set up where we call it a bifurcated trial—there
are two parts to the trial. The first part of the trial focuses
on whether or not the person committed this crime. And
so that’s the kind of evidence you hear: evidence to
prove that he committed this crime when we say he did
it, the way we say he did it . . . If they vote guilty,
however, then there is a second phase of the trial, and it
looks just like the first phase. Both sides get to present
evidence. You can expect the state to present some
evidence. The defense may present some evidence. They
are under no obligation to do so, but they may . . . When
you couple those two questions with the guilt or not
guilty question, you know, issue at the first part of the
trial, you are at three [questions] throughout the entire
trial. There are a total of three for the entire trial . . .
The very first question that is answered is guilty or not
guilty. That’s a threshold question. If that question is
answered yes, then you answer the second question
when you get it at the end of the punishment phase.56
54. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (holding that death
sentences imposed under North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
55. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
56. TX04D (emphasis added). All cited transcripts, interview recordings, and
completed survey instruments are personally maintained in locked files and passwordprotected formats. In order to ensure the highest degree of confidentiality the Author uses
a general citation to the case rather than specifically reference the trial, volume, and page
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The prosecution in this case draws the juror’s attention to the structural
similarity between the guilt and penalty phases. Although it is correct
that each phase might look the same structurally in that each side is
permitted to present evidence relevant to the question at hand, describing
the guilt phase and penalty phase as the same is somewhat misleading in
the absence of further explanation. In particular, the prosecutor
formulates the guilt decision as the first question the juror will need to
answer, thereby positioning the penalty phase questions as a logical
extension of the guilt phase inquiry. As noted in the example, jurors are
told to think about the entire trial process as a series of factual questions
which have a “yes” or “no” answer. Again, by explaining the trial in this
way, jurors are encouraged to view the punishment phase as the same as
the guilt phase and, therefore, the penalty decision as the same type of
decision as the guilt determination. By combining the guilt and penalty
phase decisions in this way, the fundamental difference between the
types of inquiry involved in the guilt phase (a factual determination) and
penalty phase (a moral judgment) is lost.
B.

A Capital Offense Is Enough to Prove Dangerousness

Jurors may use the evidence presented throughout the entire trial to
determine the defendant’s sentence. However, during jury selection
jurors are regularly told that they can rely solely on the evidence
presented during the guilt phase in order to determine an answer to the
future dangerousness question:57
So I want everybody to understand what that really
means. You have found someone guilty, hypothetically,
of intentionally or knowingly causing the death of “A”
and in the course of the same criminal transaction
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of “B” and
that answer is presumed no unless the state proves
beyond a reasonable doubt it should be answered yes.
Now, does that mean that the jury disregards the
evidence at the first phase of the trial? No. No. In fact,
numbers of transcripts.
57. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2009) (the facts of the
offense alone may be sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of future dangerousness at
the sentencing phase of the capital trial).
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the jury, when it comes time for punishment and
answering questions like this, goes back and looks at
everything that they heard in the first phase of the trial,
the guilt/innocence phase, where they hear about the
circumstances of the offense and so forth and any
additional evidence that they might hear in the
punishment phase. All right? And the law envisions there
may be some situations where the facts of the offense are
such that the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
there’s a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence in the future.58
By referencing the guilt phase of the trial and pointing out that the jurors
may hear enough during that segment of the proceeding to determine the
defendant’s dangerousness, the judge’s remarks can have the effect of
merging the two stages.
Likewise, attorneys for the state stressed that jurors were able to use
the evidence in the guilt phase as the sole determinant of the defendant’s
dangerousness. For example in one case during voir dire the state
explained to a juror how she could use the evidence presented during the
guilt phase to decide the defendant’s dangerousness:
Q: That the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Now, what kinds of
things do you think would be important to know in answering that
question?
A: His criminal background.
Q: Okay.
A: Whether he is violent in other areas of his life. If his temper is
out of control.
Q: Okay.
A: How he treats his family.
Q: Okay.
A: Things like that.
Q: Okay. Absolutely. A person’s background could be very
important. Can you see how the offense itself—might tell you everything
about a person?

58. TX02D (emphasis added).
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A: Yeah.
Q: Now, in this part of the trial you’re asked to look at the evidence,
kind of reevaluate all the evidence you heard at the guilt phase of the
trial. Because you know during the first phase of the trial when we
present evidence—
A: Right, you’re not getting all the other background.
Q: —you’re looking at it from, did he do it, did he not do it. Now
you’re taking everything you heard about the crime itself, plus any
additional evidence you heard about the defendant’s background and
now you’re looking at it to determine, you know, what kind of person is
he? How did he carry out this crime?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Why did he commit this crime? Was this a stranger-on-stranger
situation? Or was it—what was the relationship of the party?
A: Right.
Q: So those are the kinds of things you would look at, as you
pointed out, to determine whether or not the defendant is a continuing
threat to society.59
In this instance, the juror is reoriented to think about guilt phase evidence
as providing evidence of the defendant’s character. Similarly, in another
trial the prosecutor explained:
Q: And then there’s some folks who say, “No, you know, I
convicted him of capital murder, but, state, you have to prove to me that
he’s going to be a future danger.” Okay?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Okay? “You have to prove that to me in whatever way that you
can, and I’m going to wait and see what you have to offer before I will
answer this question yes.” Do you know which of those two camps you
might be in?
A: I’d have to wait and see throughout the trial all that I heard
enough evidence that this is not just what he’s being tried for, but this is
a whole pattern—
Q: Okay.
A: —of his behavior.
Q: And let me ask you about that, because the law does say that the
59. TX01D (emphasis added).
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state is allowed to rely on just the fact of the instant offense.
A: Right.
Q: And still—still be going for the death penalty. Meaning that
someone, for instance, could have nothing but—not even a speeding
ticket, but they jump up and commit capital murder, and the state can
still say, “Wait. This person may be someone who needs the death
penalty just on the facts of this, how brutal it was—the content of the
crime itself”. Do you agree that there are some crimes that, that you can
see that occurring, even if there is not a criminal history?60
After answering a question about defense evidence presented in the guilt
phase the prosecutor continued:
Q: Okay. So kind of going back to my question of can you
imagine—and you don’t have to tell me what you’re imagining, but can
you imagine in your mind a situation with a capital—of a capital murder
that falls in any of the categories that we talked about—
A: Uh-huh.
Q: —that in your mind is bad enough, essentially, that you could
find future danger based solely on the facts of that particular offense?61
The prosecutor in this trial later explained:
In other words, let’s say you’re—you’re in a trial and the
defendant doesn’t have a criminal record, per se. I can’t
show you that they have ever been arrested or not, but I
can show you a particularly horrific crime. The law says
that if you believe from that crime this possibility—or
probability of danger exists, that you can answer that
question yes. So let’s take it to the next step. They have
been found guilty of capital murder. You have
determined from the evidence, whatever it is, maybe it’s
the crime only, that there’s this probability of future
dangerousness.62
These comments are especially significant since the defendant in this
60. TX03D.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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particular case did not have a previous criminal record. This argument—
that the evidence of the crime can be used as the sole basis for
determining an answer to the first special issue question—was advanced
in all eight trials analyzed and served to indicate to jurors the continuity
between guilt and penalty decisions. As one juror who determined the
defendant’s sentence prior to the penalty phase explained:
And I’d already read the sheet about the sentencing
phase it was on the same document that I told you I
should have brought [with the special issue questions].
So because you knew what the questions were going to
be basically before you had gotten to the sentencing
stage you had already seen enough kind of evidence.
They gave it to us and that [paper] and said — [the
paper] said to the effect: “Is he a threat to society?” And
he’s already been a threat to society and there’s no
reason to believe he wouldn’t continue to be a threat to
society because he’d broken out of prison several times.
To me if you found him guilty there was only way you
could go as far as the sentencing.63
This juror described how the judge in his case had provided paper copies
of the sentencing statute to jurors to review and keep during jury
selection. The juror explained how he had considered the evidence
presented in the guilt phase in relation to the sentencing scheme and was
therefore able to develop the answers to the special issue questions in
advance of the sentencing phase. Thus, emphasizing jurors’ ability to
apply guilt phase evidence to their determination of the defendant’s
future dangerousness renders it extremely difficult for them to make an
individualized determination of the appropriate sentence.
C.

Mitigation Is an Extension of Dangerousness

Previous research has shown that capital jurors in Texas often
misunderstand the purpose and scope of mitigation evidence.64 This is in
part due to the explanations provided by the judge, prosecution, and
defense attorneys in voir dire which fail to make clear the moral decision
63. TX04D (emphasis added).
64. See generally Vartkessian, supra note 25.
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jurors are asked to make when determining the defendant’s sentence. In
addition, given that each special issue question contains words which are
vague, legal actors advance various interpretations of the sentencing
scheme. One such interpretation is that for jurors to be able to give
consideration to mitigating evidence there must be a link or nexus
between the evidence and the crime.65 For instance, in the following
example the prosecutor simply directs the juror to retrace the guilt phase
evidence when determining whether there is sufficient mitigating
evidence in order to sentence the defendant to LWOP:
Notice that [special issue question] number two does not
have the reasonable doubt standard. It’s a little more
open-ended. It’s just kind of let’s take one look back at
the offense, let’s look at what evidence, if any, was
presented during the punishment phase and let’s see
what happened.66
Similarly, the prosecutor from another trial explained:
Is there some reason to spare his life is what we’re
asking here [with special issue question number two].
And it tells you what to look at in making the
determination: All the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, which you have already
considered in the past, the defendant’s character and
background. You’ve probably looked at that in
answering is he going to be dangerous in the future, and
his personal moral culpability.67
These comments invite jurors to think about the guilt phase evidence in
determining the answers to both the future dangerousness and mitigation
special issue questions well in advance of the penalty phase. The state
also provides explanations of the term “moral blameworthiness” which
direct jurors to define this term with respect to consideration of the
defendant’s role or level of participation in committing the capital crime.
The prosecutor in one trial simply explained of mitigating evidence:

65. Id. at 268-70.
66. TX02D, supra note 59 (emphasis added).
67. TX04D, supra note 57 (emphasis added).
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It is evidence that a juror might think reduces the moral
blameworthiness of this defendant. It minimizes his
role.68
Likewise, a prosecutor from another trial commented:
This question is basically telling the jury to look at the
circumstances of the capital murder itself and any other
crimes or offenses you may hear about.69
In voir dire, the state’s questioning appears to predispose jurors to view
the defendant as guilty, prepare to sentence him to death, and to consider
the guilt phase evidence as providing all the reasons necessary to make
such a determination. Since jurors enter the guilt phase believing that the
evidence presented is relevant to sentencing, they will begin to view the
guilt phase evidence not only as evidence about his factual guilt, but also
about the defendant’s future dangerousness. It is therefore unsurprising
that jurors will frequently decide the defendant’s sentence prior to the
penalty phase.
III. Guilt Phase Evidence: The State’s Case Always Supports The
Defendant’s Dangerousness
It is the job of the state to offer evidence which persuades the jury
that the capital murder occurred and that the defendant is responsible. As
such, the evidence presented in the guilt phase regularly includes
testimony from law enforcement (e.g., first responders, homicide
detectives), testimony from crime scene experts (concerning subjects
such as the murder weapon, blood-spatter evidence, ballistics tests),
testimony from medical examiners, eye-witness testimony, DNA
evidence, fingerprint analysis, testimony of co-defendants, testimony by
other inmates in jail to whom the defendant may have confessed, crime
scene and autopsy photos, family member testimony concerning the
victim, and video or audio taped interrogations of the defendant.70
68. TX07L.
69. Id.
70. This list comprises the broad categories of evidence presented to the jury in the
guilt phases of the eight cases in this study.
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Although the state must provide such evidence of the crime in order to
establish the defendant’s guilt, such evidence is also paramount in
persuading the jury to view the defendant as dangerous. Jurors
understandably have an immediate emotional response to much of the
guilt phase evidence. It is the first time they will hear details of the
murder, listen to witnesses and victims, and observe the person allegedly
responsible for the commission of the capital crime. Though it is difficult
to pinpoint exactly what kind of evidence is especially formative in
jurors’ overall assessment of the defendant as dangerous, I briefly
discuss three areas which appear to create strong emotional reactions
with respect to jurors’ views of the defendant in the guilt phase: evidence
about the victim and his or her family, evidence of the crime, and
observations of the defendant.
A.

Victims and Their Families

In each of the eight cases in this study a victim’s family member or
loved one identified the victim, provided statements about their last
contact, or gave testimony regarding their feelings on learning about the
murder.71 Such testimony often occurred during the first day of trial and
immediately stirred jurors’ emotions. For instance, one juror described
how testimony by the victim’s wife on the first day of trial moved
several jurors to tears:
Yes, it was really hard to see the autopsy pictures and to
listen to [the victim’s family] was torture. There were
tears some of them when [the victim’s] wife talked about
how she was called to the hospital and all that. I mean it
was hard. Even some the guys were crying—I mean not
like bawling, but tears running down their faces and
sniffling. Yeah, it was tough—real hard. We started off
that way the very first day.72
In another trial, moving evidence was given by the victim’s step-father
71. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Victim impact testimony is permitted
in the punishment phase, but not in the guilt phase. Nevertheless, testimony given by
family members at this stage, while not strictly characterized as such, will frequently
illustrate their pain and suffering and thus will have an impact on the jury’s punishment
decision.
72. TX05L.
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about discovering the victim lying in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor.
Jurors recalled the emotional impact of his testimony during the guilt
phase:
Most of the girls, we kind of had a hard time with [the
step-father’s testimony]. I think that there was even a
couple of guys that walked out of there a little tearyeyed. We had a bathroom right there and all three of us
were sitting in our own stalls, well [another female juror]
and I were sitting in our own stall just crying like little
two year olds . . . I mean the mom was hard to watch but
at least she, you know, was a little put together, but the
dad, he was just crazy, it was like “Look what you did to
my baby. I was supposed to be able to protect her and I
couldn’t protect her against this.” I think that’s when
they were asking questions like what did this do to your
family and because the father was the one that came in
the door and found her they had to put him up there.73
Although the relevance of the step-father’s testimony in relation to the
defendant’s guilt was in establishing a time-line of events, jurors recalled
little of his testimony beyond the emotional impact of his presentation
and his belief that the defendant had committed the crime. As the above
juror described, aspects of the step-father’s testimony noticeably
departed from evidence strictly related to issues regarding the
defendant’s guilt—specifically his comments about failing to protect his
daughter. These types of comments, as well as the physical discomfort
displayed by witnesses, are difficult for jurors to separate from what
relevance their testimony may have in relation to the question of the
defendant’s guilt. Such displays of raw emotion reveal the palpable
suffering of the victim’s family at the outset of the trial and serve to
distract jurors from evidence strictly related to an assessment of guilt.
B.

Crime Scene Photos

In addition to testimony provided by victims’ family and friends,
each trial included the presentation of color photographs of the crime

73. TX03D, supra note 61.
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scene as evidence. Jurors recalled the pictures as “vivid.”74 One juror
described how such photographic evidence helped the jury to understand
the brutality of the crime: “I think [seeing the crime scene photos] was
crucial to see how they suffered. It was just brutal.”75 Though such
evidence may be necessary to establish that the murder occurred, it also
has the effect of inflaming jurors’ emotions and shaping their view of the
defendant as someone capable of acting in the most horrific ways. For
example, in one trial the victims were shot at close range numerous times
with an assault weapon which caused a great deal of damage to their
bodies. One juror described the lasting impression of the photos:
Seeing all of that is tough. Those things don’t disappear.
Neither do the facts and graphics, they don’t. They’re
there. They imprint on your mind. They imprint on you.
You know seeing [the victims] . . . or the blood spatter
all over the walls—remembering [one victim] crawling
away on his forearm and being continually shot as I said,
the pictures of [the other victim] with her breasts blown
off and the exit wounds, those don’t leave you.76
Research suggests that jurors respond more punitively in cases in which
they have been exposed to violent images.77 Although it is not clear what
impact the introduction of such photographic evidence had on the
eventual outcomes in these trials, such emotionally charged evidence
does elicit powerful responses from jurors who, in turn, perceive a
defendant as unmoved by the same graphic images. The defendant’s
response to such evidence may confirm, in their eyes, his guilt,
remorselessness, and lack of humanity:
[I was convinced of the defendant’s guilt] after I saw—
and it was testified to me—the brutality. The gruesome
pictures, the smug look on his face afterwards, that told

74. TX02D, supra note 59.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and
Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006);
Kevin S. Douglas et al, The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’
Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485
(1997).
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me he was guilty.78
Another juror from the same trial commented:
[The defendant] seemed to be real cocky. It was like he
really thought he was some kind of stud and he was just
kind of sitting there like “oh, I’m just going to get away
with this” and it really wasn’t all the time it was just a
couple of times I caught him doing that and he’d get this
smile on his face like “yeah, you guys got no clue how
bad I really am” you know. It was just an impression,
but he didn’t seem remorseful.79
Jurors appeared to expect the defendant to respond in the same way as
they did to the crime scene photos. When the defendant did not react
“appropriately” it confirmed his guilt and even, as the juror alluded to in
the second quote, his satisfaction at having committed the crime. The
jurors’ personal responses to the photographs, as well as their
observations of the defendant’s reactions to the evidence, are therefore
significant to the guilt decision. After having viewed the photographs,
jurors begin to form an opinion of the defendant as emotionless,
inhuman, and dangerous at an early point in the trial.
C.

Observations of Witnesses and the Defendant

A number of jurors reported watching the defendant closely
throughout the trial and were mindful of his non-verbal cues. Jurors often
perceived a lack of response from the defendant, which they considered
as evidence of both his guilt and dangerousness. For example, in one trial
jurors perceived “fear” in the two eye-witnesses to the murder when they
testified. This became a pivotal factor for determining the defendant’s
guilt:
The preponderance of the evidence, combined with the
circumstance, combined with the real and honest fear,
particularly of [one witness]. [The two eye-witnesses]
were both very fearful, very afraid, not a little afraid,
78. TX02D, supra note 59.
79. Id.
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they were maximum afraid that this guy was going to
kill them.80
The juror above credited the eye-witnesses’ testimony because she
believed each witness was fearful of the defendant. In fact, the juror
expressly stated that she found the defendant guilty for two reasons—the
brutality of the crime and the look on the defendant’s face81—in
particular, his ability to provoke fear in each witness by simply being
present in the courtroom.
Jurors reported scrutinizing the defendant’s body language and
facial expressions closely throughout the trial, looking for any reaction.
Despite such attentiveness, significant numbers of jurors believed that
the defendant exhibited no emotion whatsoever during the course of the
proceedings (76 percent), indicating him to be cold (57 percent),
remorseless (78 percent), without a conscience (71 percent),82 and
ultimately dangerousness to other people (91 percent).83
Previous research suggests that jurors are more likely to sentence a
defendant to death if they think him to be emotionally uninvolved in the
trial.84 Jurors in this study who decided that the defendant was
emotionally distant during the trial were easily able to relate such a
conclusion to the defendant’s dangerousness. The use of evidence which
provokes an emotional reaction from jurors but is unlikely to produce the
same from a defendant allows the state to influence the jury’s
consideration of the special issue questions in the guilt phase long before
the punishment phase has commenced, and often absent any counter
argument from the defense.85
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. This question has one missing case (n=45). Percentages listed are valid
percentages.
83. Jurors were asked to identify how well the terms described the defendant. The
percentages listed reflect jurors who responded that the phrase described the defendant
very well and fairly well. Jurors who selected the option choice of not so well were not
included in the reported percentages.
84. Michael E. Antonio, Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty: How the Defendant’s
Appearance During Trial Influences Capital Juror’s Punishment Decision, 24 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 215 (2006).
85. See, e.g. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (West 2003). Due to the
bifurcation of capital trials into two phases the defense is legally unable to present
evidence regarding the defendant’s background unless it is related to the question of guilt.
In practice, this means that the defense will often not present a single witness during the
guilt phase, leaving the jury to focus entirely on the state’s case. With the special issue
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IV. Guilt Deliberations
An overwhelming majority (85 percent) of jurors entered the guilt
deliberations having already decided the defendant was guilty. Moreover,
80 percent of jurors had concluded that he was guilty of capital murder.
Thus, very few jurors entered deliberations undecided (11 percent) or
believing the defendant to be not guilty of capital murder (4 percent).86
One jury began deliberations by discussing the evidence presented
during the guilt phase, eventually reaching a consensus about the final
verdict. However, in the seven remaining trials juries began deliberations
with an initial vote87 in order to gauge individual opinions about the
defendant’s guilt. As one juror described:
I think we first of all went around the table and
everybody talked about how they felt about [the
defendant’s guilt] and whether or not they had made a
decision, if you were still unsure. If you were sure what
you were leaning towards. Each person made a comment
and they discussed it while it was their turn. They
discussed any and everything they wanted to.88
Jurors in each case reported that at least one member of the jury was
either “undecided” or not quite convinced of the defendant’s guilt at the
questions immediately framing the evidence presented in terms of the defendant’s
dangerousness, this structural limitation serves to disadvantage the defense. The defense
called witnesses to give evidence in the guilt phase in three of the eight cases included in
this study. Two of those three trials ended in sentences of LWOP.
86. Jurors were asked about their guilt decision after hearing the judge’s
instructions to the jury, but before they began deliberating with the other jurors.
87. Juries who conducted initial votes did so in one of three ways. Some juries
conducted formal votes—either by secret ballot or a show of hands. Other juries went
around the room, allowing each person to explain their position on guilt. While the
second, less formal method did not ask jurors to take a firm position on the defendant’s
guilt immediately, jurors inevitably expressed their opinion providing a de facto vote.
The single case which did not take a vote began deliberation with a review of evidence
and discussion of the standards of proof for guilt. Each method is consistent with
previous research which has classified deliberations in two categories—verdict-driven or
evidence-driven. See REID HASTIE ET AL, INSIDE THE JURY 163-65 (1983) (verdict-driven
deliberations begin with a public ballot, are guided by verdict positions of individual
jurors, and engage in frequent polling. Evidence-driven deliberations are categorized by
public balloting late in deliberations. Jurors in evidence-driven deliberations are not
closely associated to a specific verdict).
88. TX02D, supra note 59.
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beginning of deliberations. The data indicate that jurors who were in the
majority helped focus the discussion on factors which would persuade
those who were undecided. Since each trial involved a majority of jurors
who believed the defendant to be guilty, this always included an
extended review of the crime scene photos. As one juror explained:
We actually put [the crime scene photos] up on a board,
first of all we started a list of things we had questions
about and tried to eliminate them and or go through them
. . . We looked at [the male victim] and how he fell and
moved forward and I think that is when I discovered his
hand prints in blood where he actually tried to crawl
away and we don’t know that he ever said anything but
it appeared he was begging . . . .89
The guilt deliberations therefore often involved juries retracing the
state’s case in some detail and focusing on aggravating factors. Jurors
regularly inferred specifics from the evidence about what the victim may
have experienced in their final moments, as the quotation above
illustrates. Although it is expected that jurors will and should discuss
issues such as the defendant’s motive, responsibility for the killing, the
role of an accomplice, the strength of witness testimony, the judge’s
instructions to the jury, and whether jurors agree on the meaning of the
standard of proof, much of jurors’ deliberations also focused on topics
outside of the defendant’s guilt. For instance, jurors reported rampant
discussions of topics more relevant to the punishment decision than to a
determination of the defendant’ guilt. For instance, 65 percent of jurors
reported some discussion during guilt deliberations regarding the
defendant’s dangerousness if ever allowed back in society. Likewise, 85
percent of jurors reported some discussion of the defendant’s history of
crime and violence, 91 percent discussed the pain and suffering of the
victim, 83 percent discussed the loss and grief of the victim’s family, and
nearly two-thirds of jurors (65 percent) discussed their feelings about the
right punishment.
The emphasis placed by other jurors on the defendant’s
dangerousness when deliberating on his guilt proved to be especially
moving to jurors who were undecided. As one initially undecided juror
described:
89. Id.
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Q: You said that there were roughly eight people who felt like he
was guilty and they really didn’t have any questions. So, I want to know
how they explained to you and the other folks who were still needing a
little bit of clarification on stuff – what did they say? What were their
arguments to you?
A: They were saying, o.k., look at the pictures. Look at the brutality
of the pictures. The gruesomeness down the line. The fact that he had an
assault weapon and one [victim] did not have a weapon—one did have a
weapon. His demeanor. Gosh—there were so many questions—but they
were proving them—proving them by what they were bringing up.90
Another juror from the same trial commented:
The crime scene photos were asked for to kind of
reinforce the fact that it wasn’t about this one person [the
defendant]. It was about these two other people. That in
my mind was the reason that we asked for those pictures
to be brought back in. They were horrible and nobody
wanted to look at them, but it’s like, we’ve got to look to
remember that these people had lives. They were moving
on and becoming good members of society. They
weren’t perfect—like none of us are, but they didn’t
deserve this bloodbath and it was a bloodbath.91
This juror’s observations are evocative of comments more often made by
jurors when describing the penalty phase—not the guilt phase. The juror
seems to ignore the intention of the guilt phase, which concerns the
defendant’s actions and whether he is legally responsible for the crime.
Instead, she is so moved by the graphic pictures that she focuses on
holding someone responsible for the terrible crime, rather than making
an individual determination regarding this particular defendant’s guilt.
Thus, discussions of the defendant’s dangerousness during guilt
deliberations can enable jurors to side-step the question of the
defendant’s guilt.
Given the tenor of guilt deliberations high numbers of jurors
reported discussing whether the defendant would be dangerous and what
90. Id.
91. Id.
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punishment they thought he deserved. Although the jury is directed by
the judge not to discuss the potential punishment during the guilt phase,
nearly two-thirds of jurors (65 percent) reported some premature
discussion of the defendant’s punishment, while the same percentage
also reported discussing the defendant’s dangerousness. As one juror
explained:
Well, we knew though that those questions, if we made a
decision, how we had to answer those or what we would
have to think about so it did kind of come into part of
our decision.92
Indeed, half of the jurors (50 percent) indicated that during the guilt
deliberations they even discussed whether the defendant would ever be
executed. Finally, almost a quarter of jurors (22 percent) reported some
discussion about how soon the defendant would get out of prison if he
was not given a sentence of death. This final topic is especially
interesting given that all cases included in this study were tried after
LWOP became the sentencing alternative to death.
Regardless of whether jurors openly discussed the appropriate
punishment for the defendant, their accounts indicate that much of the
guilt-phase deliberations were spent discussing evidence and testimony
which stirred their emotions. These discussions tended to center on the
jurors’ feelings about the victim, the victim’s family, their observations
of the defendant, and their feelings towards him. Nearly all of the jurors
(94 percent) reported discussing the brutal or vile manner of the killing,
while 91 percent reported some discussion about the suffering of the
victim. An overwhelming majority of jurors (78 percent) discussed their
feelings for the family of the victim, while 74 percent discussed their
feelings toward the defendant. Finally, 87 percent of jurors reported
some discussion of the defendant’s appearance or manner in court during
the guilt deliberations. For instance, one juror commented, “We
discussed that he never blinked. He never showed any sign of remorse.”93
These conversations appeared to shape jurors’ views about the
defendant’s character, helping to create a picture of the defendant as
dangerous and, in some cases, as evil. Thus, even juries who did not
discuss the defendant’s sentence explicitly were in essence deliberating
92. Id.
93. TX03D, supra note 61.
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upon the answer to the first special issue question regarding the
defendant’s dangerousness before any punishment phase evidence had
been presented. In fact, many jurors did not recall a difference between
the future dangerousness question and the mitigation question, indicating
that discussions which implied that the defendant was dangerous in turn
served to shape jurors’ understanding of the defendant’s character and
background. Jurors who both believed the defendant to be dangerous,
and did not distinguish between the dangerousness and mitigation issues
were therefore able to determine an answer to both questions prior to the
presentation of any penalty phase evidence.
Of particular importance were those occasions when jurors were
uncertain about the defendant’s guilt. In those instances candid jury
discussions focused not on delivering a not-guilty verdict, but on the
appropriate punishment.94 Fifteen percent of the jurors in this study
reported at least one member of their jury as having said they would join
the majority’s vote to convict the defendant of capital murder, but would
refuse to impose a sentence of death due to doubts about his guilt.95
Uncertainties about the defendant’s guilt should not result in a lesser
sentence, but rather in the acquittal of the defendant for the capital
offense. When jurors decide to convict a defendant of a capital crime
despite misgivings, it necessarily calls into question the validity of the
conviction.
Jurors who negotiated a life sentence for a defendant during guilt
deliberations used either the special issue question related to the
94. Jurors in this situation did not necessarily believe that the defendant was
factually innocent, but rather some jurors did not think the offense should have been
eligible for capital punishment. For instance, in one case the jury believed the defendant
was present during a burglary-homicide. However, no evidence was presented to confirm
the defendant was the triggerman. While the jury was convinced the defendant had
participated in the burglary they were not sure he was responsible for the murder and thus
did not want to find him guilty of the capital crime. In only one trial was the issue of the
defendant’s factual innocence raised during guilt deliberations. One member of the jury
was not convinced the defendant had committed the double murder. That jury eventually
sentenced the defendant to death.
95. Jurors were asked whether any member of their jury said they would vote guilty
of capital murder, but would not vote for a death sentence during guilt deliberations. The
seven jurors who reported a member of the jury saying that they would vote guilty of
capital murder but would not vote for the death penalty originated from five trials. Three
of those trials resulted in a sentence of LWOP while two resulted in sentences of death.
See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy,
Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L REV. 1557 (1998) (noting that residual
doubt is a strong mitigating factor in cases with multiple defendants and circumstantial
evidence).
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defendant’s participation as a party to the capital murder96 or the
mitigation special issue question as the statutory mechanism for
expressing residual doubt about the defendant’s responsibility.97 In three
of the four cases which resulted in sentences of LWOP members of the
jury used evidence related to the crime (e.g., the defendant was not
necessarily the person who shot the victim, the victim’s actions were
partly to blame for the capital crime, or the defendant didn’t necessarily
mean to kill the victim) as the reason to spare the defendant’s life. Jurors
who were leaning towards a life sentence often cited such guilt related
issues as the reason they believed that the defendant should be given a
life sentence.
V.

Premature Punishment Decisions

After going through guilt deliberations that often focus on the
defendant’s dangerousness, nearly a quarter of jurors (24 percent)
reported having determined that the defendant should be sentenced to
death prior to the commencement of the punishment phase. Though
legally required not to determine the defendant’s penalty before the
punishment phase starts, with 15 percent having decided he deserved
LWOP, only 61 percent of jurors reported being undecided at the
beginning of the penalty phase.
Perceptions about the defendant’s dangerousness were central to
jurors’ premature determination of a death sentence. The following juror
explained why she felt the defendant should be sentenced to death before
hearing any punishment phase evidence:
Because he was just brutal. He didn’t show any remorse.
He just seemed like he didn’t value anyone else’s life
and I just felt that if he were to be let out he’d kill again,
he’d kill someone else. He just point blank shot, you
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(2) (West 2009) (explaining
that “in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the jury to
find the defendant guilty as a party under sections 7.01 and 7.02 of the [Texas] Penal
Code,” the jury will be instructed to answer “whether the defendant actually caused the
death of the deceased or did not actually cause the death of the deceased but intended to
kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human life would be taken.” This special
issue question follows the dangerousness issue and precedes the mitigation issue).
97. See Sundby, supra note 96, at 1577. See also Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1563
(1998).
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know, several times and you could see where [the male
victim] was dragging himself to get away from [the
defendant] and [the defendant] just kept shooting him
and the girl too in the car. I mean he just point blank at
close range just shot her and it wasn’t like he just shot
them once or twice and ran. He shot them, what,
twenty—seventeen times? I can’t see anybody just doing
something like that.98
Jurors who decided that the defendant should receive a death sentence
were thus unable to understand how the defendant could do what they
believed he did. Given that during jury selection jurors were told that
they could use the evidence of the crime as the sole factor in answering
the dangerousness special issue question, jurors did not need to suspend
their judgment. The nature of the crime and the evidence presented
during the guilt phase was enough for jurors to determine the defendant’s
sentence.
Jurors who made a premature decision to sentence the defendant to
LWOP also engaged in discussions about the defendant’s dangerousness,
but made an early determination to sentence him to life due to factors
related to the commission of the crime. Specifically, a number of such
jurors had reached the decision to sentence the defendant to LWOP in
order to go along with the majority verdict at guilt. As the following
juror expressed:
I gave in that he was guilty because of the way the law’s
written, but I will not give in that he will have the death
penalty. Even if he’s dead in there. I’m not going to be
responsible for actually knowing that he got the death
penalty.99
Other jurors who self-identified as premature deciders for a sentence of
LWOP did not actually determine the sentence early, but rather
maintained a clearer understanding of the standard of proof required for a
defendant to be sentenced to death:
I went into [the penalty phase] expecting a life sentence.
98. TX02D, supra note 59.
99. TX06L.

33

VARTKESSIAN_Formatted_Finalv1

480

6/27/2012 9:20 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

[The state] had to prove beyond a reasonable [doubt]—
you had to answer all those other questions so you err on
the side of life until you answer those questions—so to
me a reasonable person you feel like life is expected
basically and then you seek the death penalty or imagine
the death penalty.100
Jurors like the one quoted above did not actually determine the
defendant’s sentence in advance of the punishment phase, but rather
entered the next part of the trial prepared to hold the state to the correct
standard of proof before deciding whether a death sentence was
appropriate.
Jurors therefore determine the defendant’s sentence prior to the
penalty phase for several reasons. For one, jurors are induced into
viewing the trial as a unitary rather than bifurcated proceeding. This
blurs the distinction between the guilt and punishment decisions. Juror
experiences during voir dire also often result in a misunderstanding of
the difference between the future dangerousness special issue question
and the mitigation special issue question. Since the evidence presented
during the guilt phase provides jurors with the evidence they often rely
on to determine the answer to the dangerousness question, jurors who do
not grasp the distinction between the special issue questions determine an
answer to both well before the penalty phase. Finally, some jurors
determined the defendant’s sentence early because they decided to
convict the defendant of the capital crime despite their misgivings about
his guilt in return for ensuring he received a life sentence.
VI. Discussion
Early exposure to the future dangerousness special issue question
distorts the psychological barriers between culpability and punishment
decisions thereby encouraging premature sentencing verdicts. It can also
have biasing effects on jurors’ views of the defendant’s guilt. The early
exposure to the concept of the defendant’s future dangerousness at jury
selection followed by evidence of the crime presented in the guilt phase
will frequently foster fearful responses in jurors. As others have noted,
the concept of dangerousness cannot be easily divorced from feelings of
fear because:
100. TX05L supra note 73.
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Being afraid implies that the situation at hand is
perceived as dangerous, regardless of how vague this
perception may be. It is logically impossible to be afraid
but not to judge the situation as threatening.101
Thus, capital jurors in Texas are told they will need to think about the
defendant as a potentially dangerous person and are presented evidence
that engenders fear. This makes it easier to view the defendant as guilty
and easier to vote for his death. Early exposure to the future
dangerousness special issue question widens the chasm between the
defendant and the juror, which is significant hurdle for the defense to
overcome. This chasm or “empathic divide” as Haney refers to it, can be
understood as:
[T]he cognitive and emotional distance between [jurors
and the defendant] that makes genuine understanding
and insight into the role of social history and context in
shaping a capital defendant’s life course so difficult to
acquire. The recognition of basic human commonality –
an opportunity for capital jurors to connect themselves to
the defendant through familiar experiences, common
moral dilemmas, and recognizable human tragedies – is
the starting point for compassionate justice. But the
empathic divide stands in the way of that kind of
understanding. Its roots are deep but not difficult to
trace. Precisely because the harm for which the
defendant has been held responsible is so great, and the
typical capital defendant is perceived by jurors as truly
different from themselves (made so by his behavior if
nothing else), there is always a gap in understanding that
must be overcome.102
Thus, by channeling the sentencing decision through a determination of
the defendant’s future dangerousness jurors are less likely to engage in a
101. Ute Gabriel & Werner Greve, The Psychology of Fear of Crime: Conceptual
and Methodological Perspectives, 43 Brit. J. CRIMINOLOGY 600, 602 (2003).
102. Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical
Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1582
(2004).
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reasoned moral decision because they are placed in a situation in which
they cannot assess the defendant’s penalty neutrally.
The Supreme Court has held that the dangerousness special issue
question is constitutional, because it asks the jury to make a routine
consideration when determining the defendant’s sentence.103 But, as the
data presented in this Article indicate, jurors often base their decision
regarding dangerousness on emotionally-charged evidence presented
during the guilt phase, in violation of the constitutional mandate that they
suspend their penalty decision until after they have found the defendant
guilty. Therefore, the issue to be addressed is not necessarily whether
jurors are making a routine decision often formulated by other actors
within the criminal justice system.104 Instead it is this: how are jurors
determining an answer to the dangerousness special issue question and at
what point in the trial?
The Court has yet to decide whether the inclusion of the future
dangerousness special issue question and its presentation to the jury
during voir dire undermines both the presumption of innocence during
the culpability phase and the requirement that jurors determine the
defendant’s penalty in a separate hearing after the guilt phase. The
Court’s decision in Deck v. Missouri105 however provides a line of
reasoning which could apply to this issue. In Deck, the Court discussed
how observing a shackled capital defendant can prematurely persuade
the jury to view the defendant as dangerous. The Court explained:
It also almost inevitably adversely affects the jury’s
perception of the character of the defendant. And it
thereby inevitably undermines the jury’s ability to weigh
accurately all relevant considerations — considerations
103. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“Indeed, prediction of future
criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our
criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance,
must often turn on a judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct. Any sentencing
authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in
the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison,
these same predictions must be made by parole authorities.”)
104. Indeed, commentators have likened determinations of future dangerousness in
Texas capital cases to modern fortune telling: “[P]sychiatric predictions based on
hypothetical situations sometimes bear more resemblance to medieval fortune-telling
than to modern scientific techniques.” TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS
JUSTICE
AND
THE
DEATH
PENALTY
45
(2000),
available
at
http://02f2fd4.netsolhost.com/tds/images/publications/Chap3.pdf.
105. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
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that are often unquantifiable and elusive—when it
determines whether a defendant deserves death. In these
ways, the use of shackles can be a “thumb [on] death’s
side of the scale.”106
The Court concluded that a defendant’s due process rights were violated
when such security measures were taken without adequate cause. As
with the shackles at issue in Deck, emphasizing the future dangerousness
issue during jury selection prejudices the jury and undermines the capital
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Moreover, because jurors are told that
they can rely solely on the culpability evidence to make a future
dangerousness determination, the bifurcation of the trial fails to perform
the function envisioned by the Supreme Court in Gregg and its progeny.
When the United States Supreme Court sanctioned guided-discretion
models as a constitutional form of capital punishment, it acted on the
assumption that structural changes to the capital trial could counteract the
inherent randomness thought to exist in discretionary capital
sentencing.107 The Court placed great weight on the premise that
bifurcation of the trial into two distinct phases would help sentencers
separate their guilt and punishment decisions. As the Court observed in
Gregg v. Georgia:
As a general proposition these concerns are best met by
a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at
which the sentencing authority is appraised of the
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and
provided with standards to guide its use of the
information.108
Any system which invites and encourages jurors to focus prematurely on
sentencing issues undermines this constitutional requirement. Thus, the
Texas capital punishment system appears to fail the most fundamental
tests of constitutionality.
Moreover, we have also observed that jurors tend to base their belief
106. Id. at 633 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sochor v. Florida,
504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992)).
107. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
248-51 (1976) (laying out the mitigating and aggravating factors to be weighed in a jury
determination); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-73 (1976).
108. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196.
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about the defendant’s dangerousness on evidence which is extremely
unlikely to result in accurate future predictions of dangerousness.
Although not fully developed here, it appears that the inclusion of the
future dangerousness special issue question further undermines the
morally principled decision jurors are asked to make by introducing a
fundamentally subjective standard as a factual determination. Jurors are
led to believe there can be a “right answer” to the dangerousness special
issue question, when in fact the vast majority of dangerousness
predictions have been and will continue to be incorrect.
Research regarding the functioning of the modern death penalty in
America has identified inherent failures within the system that no amount
of restructuring or tinkering is likely to eliminate.109 Although America’s
experiment with the death penalty has largely failed, a minority of
jurisdictions—including a handful of counties in Texas—continue to
frequently use capital punishment.110 Given that Texas is responsible for
most of the executions and high numbers of death sentences in America,
the following further suggestions are offered in an effort to bring the
practices within the state into accord with constitutional requirements.
The inclusion of the future dangerousness special issue question
appears to damage the integrity of the bifurcated capital trial and
therefore ought to be legislatively removed. Although not conclusive, it
is interesting that during the two-year period from which the sample of
cases included in this study was drawn, not a single juror answered “no”
to the future dangerousness special issue question.111 Given that there is
likely to be little variation in jurors’ beliefs about capital defendant’s
dangerousness it appears that the future dangerousness special issue
question fails to significantly further narrow death eligibility for the vast
majority of capital defendants.112 Since the Texas statute already narrows
109. See generally AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION,
(James R. Acker et al. 2d ed. 1998).
110. GARLAND, supra note 42, at 40-42; James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke,
Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
(forthcoming) (on file with Author).
111. The sample was drawn between 2006 and 2008. During that time, seventeen
capital trials were conducted. One resulted in a hung jury at the guilt phase, four resulted
in sentences of LWOP, and the remaining twelve cases resulted in death sentences. Of the
four cases to result in LWOP three did on the mitigation special issue question, while one
did on the criminal liability question related to the defendant’s participation in the capital
murder. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (West 2011).
112. Although rare, there have been cases in which the jury has returned a life
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the class of defendants eligible to receive the death penalty by
identifying particular types of aggravated murder which render a
defendant death-eligible, no further narrowing is required.113 In other
words, the removal of the future dangerousness issue would not strip the
Texas statute of the constitutional requirement to limit the application of
the death penalty.114
However, the removal of the future dangerousness special issue
question can only be recommended if other modifications to the Texas
statute were undertaken. The mitigation special issue question, even if it
were to stand alone, is fraught with ambiguity making it difficult for
jurors to understand. For instance, if the future dangerousness special
issue question was removed and the mitigation special issue question
remained, jurors would continue to be confused by the concept of the
defendant’s moral blameworthiness. Absent a clearer articulation about
how the guilt and penalty phase determinations differ, the lower standard
of proof for finding mitigation, that jurors need not be unanimous about
the mitigation question or in fact even in agreement about what factors
they consider to be mitigating, and that LWOP will result if the jury
cannot reach a decision, jurors will continue to fail in their attempts to
follow the law.
Yet, the problem identified throughout this Article extends beyond
the future dangerousness issue. Because capital jurors go through the
process of death-qualification and are told in advance of the penalty
phase to think of a time when they might have to decide if the defendant
should be sentenced to death, evidence presented in the guilt phase will
always be relevant to sentencing, regardless of whether it is channeled
through the future dangerousness special issue question. In some ways
then, the analysis undertaken here serves to underscore how the future
dangerousness special issue question expands the malevolent effects of
death-qualification. Experts have offered a couple of solutions to the
problems created by bifurcation. One suggestion is to empanel a jury that
verdict after determining the defendant not to be a future danger. See Jury Instructions,
Texas v. Estrada, No. 2008-CR-5290 (Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2010); Jury Instructions, Texas v.
Segura, No. 07-10058, (Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2009); Jury Instructions, Texas v. Garcia, No.
04-9000606 (Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2008).
113. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 2011).
114. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (1976) (death penalty cannot be imposed in an
arbitrary and capricious manner). Cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976)
(Florida examines eight different aggravating factors in their determination of death
penalty applicability). See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (individualized
sentencing requires the evaluation of mitigating factors).
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is not death-qualified to determine guilt, then, if the defendant is found
guilty, empanel a second separate death-qualified jury to determine
punishment. Although this might appear to alleviate some of the
shortcomings of bifurcation this method would prevent the defendant
from benefiting from highly persuasive mitigating evidence related to the
crime such as residual doubt. A second suggestion is to impanel a nondeath-qualified jury with the maximum number of alternates. If the jury
finds the defendant guilty they will be death-qualified after the guilt
phase but before the presentation of penalty phase evidence. Although
this second method allows for the jury to hear potentially relevant
mitigating evidence related to the crime, it risks empaneling jurors who
are committed to sentencing the defendant to death in the particular trial,
as opposed to death-qualifying a juror generally.115
At a minimum, steps should also be taken to limit the amount of
repeated exposure the jury receives to the future dangerousness special
issue question during voir dire. Although death-qualification permits the
questioning of jurors about their ability to determine answers to the
special issue questions, arguments that emphasize the ability of the guilt
phase evidence to determine an answer to the future dangerousness
special issue question do little to clarify the distinct nature of the jury’s
sentencing decision. Rather, such arguments compel jurors to
contemplate punishment during the guilt phase. If the dangerousness
special issue question remains, judges should limit attorney arguments
regarding the applicability of guilt phase evidence to the determination of
the defendant’s future dangerousness to the penalty phase.
VII. Conclusion
By providing jurors with the concept of dangerousness as the central
focus for their sentencing decision, dangerousness permeates how jurors
perceive the defendant. These data indicate that an overwhelming
number of jurors make their decision concerning the defendant’s
punishment before any penalty phase evidence is presented. Thus, the
statutory emphasis on the defendant’s dangerousness, which has been
exhaustively discussed during jury selection and reinforced by the
evidence presented in the guilt phase, facilitates premature decision-

115. Richard Salgado, Note, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a
Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green,
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 519 (2005).
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making.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the constitutional significance
of providing a capital defendant an individualized sentence
determination. However, the experiences of jurors during voir dire
appear to confuse the purpose of bifurcation and frustrate efforts to limit
arbitrariness in sentencing. Yet as the law stands, death-qualification will
remain part of any capital trial, meaning that every juror will know the
precise scope of the sentencing scheme prior to the start of the guilt
phase. Courts must recognize that the inclusion of the future
dangerousness question in the Texas statute has particularly deleterious
effects on jurors’ ability to distinguish between the two phases of the
trial.
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